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The 2002 farm bill has beencriticized from day one. Free-trade advocates criticized the
significant increase in domestic sub-
sidies for U.S. farmers at a time when
the rest of the world was seemingly
moving toward more liberalized pro-
duction and trade. Small-farm advo-
cates criticized the ability of large
farms to bypass payment limitations
through the use of commodity cer-
tificates. Conservation advocates
thought they had accomplished a
major feat with the Conservation Se-
curity Program, but implementation
rules and subsequent funding cuts
have shown that the program will
have little short-term impact. And
rural development advocates criti-
cized the bill for its continued focus
on supporting commodities rather
than rural income enhancement.
Most groups criticize the farm
bill because they would like to ac-
complish something different with
the legislation. Disagreement and
debate about the objectives of farm
policy is a critical part of the policy
discussion. But it is also crucial to
know if the current commodity pro-
grams are in fact accomplishing
what Congress wants them to do. If
not, then they should be reformed,
even if Congress does not alter its
policy objectives.
It is not easy to pin down what
farm programs are supposed to ac-
complish. The rhetoric of program
defenders offers little guidance be-
cause the arguments employed are
usually based on myths rather than
facts. For example, farm programs
are often touted as providing con-
sumers with inexpensive food when
the reality is that the retail price of
food bears little relationship to the
price of supported commodities.
Since 9/11, some say we need farm
programs for national security rea-
sons when almost all analysts sug-
gest that aggregate production of
food would change little if we did
away with the programs. Others say
that current farm programs en-
hance rural vitality. But the data
show that the least economically
viable rural regions are those that
have become most dependent on
farm subsidies. The biggest myth is
that farm programs help vulnerable
small family farmers when it is
abundantly clear that it is the large
commercial operations that are
helped the most.
Judging Congress by its actions
instead of its words, we conclude
that the primary objective of cur-
rent commodity programs is to
support income for the U.S. field
crop sector. Furthermore, because
Congress set up crop-specific sup-
port levels, we also conclude that
Congress wants to support income
on a crop-by-crop basis. Various
interpretations of what is meant by
farm income could be made, but
because Congress has little con-
trol over production costs, an ap-
propriate measure of Congress’s
intent is to spend money so that
total revenue for each supported
crop does not fall below a speci-
fied level. We calculate this level
for each crop by simple arithmetic.
The target for each crop’s rev-
enue is assumed to be expected
production times the loan rate plus
the maximum countercyclical pay-
ment rate times base acreage times
base yield for the countercyclical
payment program plus the direct
payment rate times base acreage
times base yield for the direct pay-
ment program. These calculations
result in target revenues of approxi-
mately $25 billion for corn and
$15.5 billion for soybeans. Given
these targets, a taxpayer-cost-effi-
cient farm program would spend
money to bring revenue up to the
target level when market income
falls short of the targeted amount.
When market revenue exceeds this
amount, then an efficient program
would cut off support.
DO CURRENT PROGRAMS HIT
THEIR TARGETS?
Figure 1 shows that current farm
programs have done a poor job at
meeting their objective for corn
and soybeans. In 2002, market rev-
enue for corn fell short of the target
amount by about $3.8 billion, yet
farm programs paid out only $2.1
billion. In 2003, corn farmers re-
ceived $2.1 billion in support, yet
their market income was about
equal to the target level. And in
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2004, market income fell short of
the target by $1.4 billion, but we es-
timate that payments will exceed
$7 billion. For soybeans, market in-
comes exceeded target incomes in
2003 and 2004 and the shortfall in
2002 was only $130 million. But to-
tal payments exceeded $2.1 billion
over this period.
When a policy tool fails to hit a
target, the usual explanation is that
the wrong tool was used. In 2002,
market income was low because
U.S. aggregate yield was below trend
levels and prices did not increase
enough to compensate. The only
support producers received in 2002
(ignoring ad hoc disaster payments
for now) was in the form of direct
payments and these payments were
not large enough to compensate for
low aggregate yields. Furthermore,
in 2002 many corn regions had good
yields. The low aggregate corn yield
was caused by drought in the west-
ern Corn Belt. But all regions re-
ceived direct payments, regardless
of regional income levels.
The largest miss occurred in
the current 2004 crop year. Record
yields led to record production.
Prices fell dramatically, but there
was only a small shortfall in market
revenue. This type of low-price,
high-yield year is what really trig-
gers payments under current farm
programs. We project that the cur-
rent corn program will overshoot
its target by almost $6 billion.
The soybean misses largely
have been caused by direct pay-
ments arriving even when soybean
revenue meets or exceeds its target
amount. In addition, harvest prices
in 2004 were low enough to trigger
loan deficiency payments, even
though subsequent price increases
have enabled farmers to market
their crops at much higher prices.
Thus, soybean farmers are pro-
jected to receive almost $1 billion
in payments for their 2004 crop
even though total market revenue
is projected to exceed the target
level by $1 billion.
The mismatch between re-
gional payments received and re-
gional market revenue is more
pronounced with soybeans. Much
of the 2003 price strength was a re-
sult of very poor yields in Nebraska,
western Iowa, and South Dakota.
Yet farmers in these regions re-
ceived the same direct payment as
farmers in regions with normal
yields. This illustrates the poor per-
formance of current farm programs
in compensating for low regional
yields. Some might say that disaster
payments in 2002 and 2003 partly
compensated for these low regional
yields. But if Congress recognizes
the need for supplemental assis-
tance caused by widespread low
regional yields, wouldn’t it be sen-
sible to develop a new farm policy
tool that automatically accounts for
low yields as well as low prices? To
find such a tool, Congress could
look beyond USDA’s Farm Service
Agency and focus its attention on
another USDA agency.
INCOME SUPPORT FROM THE RISK
MANAGEMENT AGENCY
For the 2005 crop year, we esti-
mate that almost 6 million acres
of U.S. corn and soybeans will be
insured with Group Risk Income
Protection (GRIP). This product
provides a guarantee that county
revenue will not fall below 90 per-
cent of the product of expected
market price and trend yield. This
product seems ideally suited to
hit congressional revenue targets.
Either low prices or low yields can
trigger a payment. But low prices
by themselves will not trigger a
payment if yields are high enough
to raise revenue above the 90 per-
cent level. And low yields will not
trigger a payment if prices are
strong enough. In addition, if pay-
ments arrive when aggregate mar-
ket revenue exceeds its target
level, then at least the payments
would flow to those regions that
experienced inadequate revenue
because of low yields.
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FIGURE 1. DO FARM BILL PAYMENTS ARRIVE WHEN REVENUE IS LOW?
FIGURE 2. WOULD GRIP PAYMENTS ARRIVE WHEN REVENUE IS LOW?
To determine how well GRIP
might perform as a commodity
policy, we simulated GRIP payments
to farmers assuming that a 90 per-
cent GRIP policy was given to all
corn and soybean farmers in 2002,
2003, and 2004. Figure 2 shows that
GRIP does not perform as well as
one might expect. For corn, GRIP
would have overcompensated farm-
ers in 2004 and undercompensated
them in 2002. For soybeans, GRIP
did a good job at not overcompen-
sating farmers for aggregate losses
in 2002 and 2003, but GRIP would
have greatly overcompensated
farmers in 2004.
The reason GRIP performs so
erratically is that its guarantees are
based on futures prices. In 2002, the
expected corn price was $2.30/bu
and the expected soybean price was
only $4.53/bu. These prices are not
adequate to provide the level of pro-
tection desired by Congress. In
2004, expected prices were dramati-
cally higher at $2.93 and $7.27. The
overcompensation in 2004 from
GRIP is a direct result of market
prices providing more protection
than desired by Congress. While a
market-based revenue product is
desirable as an insurance product,
it is less desirable in a national com-
modity policy.
A NEW REVENUE-BASED
COMMODITY POLICY
An easy fix for one of the weaknesses
of GRIP as a commodity policy is to
replace futures prices with a fixed
price to calculate county revenue
guarantees. An easy fix for the over-
compensation that occurs when
farmers use low harvest prices to
maximize marketing loan benefits is
to calculate payments based on sea-
son-average prices, much like we do
with the current countercyclical pay-
ment program. Figure 3 shows that
such a modified GRIP program would
closely match payments with rev-
enue shortfalls if all corn and soy-
FIGURE 3. WOULD MODIFIED GRIP PAYMENTS ARRIVE WHEN REVENUE IS LOW?
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grams, and grazing and water subsi-
dies. For 1999, the addition of the
$5.47 billion in PFC payments turns
into a $12.88 billion increase in re-
ported support. Figure 2 shows a
breakdown of our revised estimate
of 1999 agricultural support. Mar-
keting loan benefits (through loan
deficiency payments or marketing
loan gains) account for 30 percent
of this support. PFC payments, mar-
bean farmers received such a policy
instead of current farm programs.
We calculated the Figure 3 re-
sults assuming that county revenue
guarantees are based on a $2.73
corn price and a $6.00 soybean
price. A payment was made to all
farmers in a county if the product of
the season-average price and the
yield per planted acre fell below 90
percent of the guarantee. Figure 3
shows that this new policy tool
would have avoided most of the
overcompensation of corn and soy-
bean farmers in 2004. The lower
overcompensation that occurred in
2003 results from payments being
targeted to those counties with low
yields. For corn in 2002, the new
policy would have come much
closer to hitting the revenue target
than either the current farm pro-
gram or the market-based GRIP.
WTO OUTLOOK
A GRIP-type farm program would be
classified as “Amber Box” under the
current WTO agriculture agreement
and the Doha Round framework be-
cause payments are tied to the cur-
rent price level and the farmers’
choices in planted acres. The pro-
gram could be modified to fit within
the “Blue Box” or the “Green Box.”
However, the modifications might
limit the effectiveness of the pro-
gram. The Blue Box modifications
would allow payments to be trig-
gered by price declines or regional
yield disasters, but the payments
could not change with national and/
or farm shifts in planted areas. Green
Box modifications would allow price
and/or yield reductions to trigger
payments and some updating for re-
gional shifts in crop production; but
shifts in farm production would not
be accounted for and the program
would require larger price and/or
yield declines to trigger payments.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Matching up policy tools with
policy objectives is critical for pro-
gram cost-efficiency. It is not sur-
prising that our current mix of
farm programs does a poor job of
matching program support and
market revenue shortfalls. These
programs are with us for a variety
of reasons: program inertia, oppor-
tunism concerning budget scoring,
and WTO considerations. They are
not the result of a deliberate pro-
cess of choosing program instru-
ments for their efficiency in
meeting program objectives.
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A more deliberate process
would reveal that our commodity
programs consist of two programs
that protect against low prices, one
program that delivers aid even
when farm income is at an all-time
high, and an ad hoc disaster system
that pays out when regional produc-
tion is low. In addition, we have a
crop insurance program that also
pays out when low yields or low
prices occur and that offers a pro-
gram, GRIP, that could easily be
modified to replace all commodity
and crop insurance programs for
major field crops.
Rationalizing commodity, disas-
ter, and crop insurance programs
by replacing them with a single-pay-
ment program based on a modifica-
tion of GRIP would increase
program transparency, eliminate
program duplication, reduce admin-
istrative costs, and largely eliminate
over- and undercompensation of
farmers. Perhaps budget pressures
will lead congressional leaders and
farm groups to take a fresh look at
the current structure of farm pro-
grams with an eye toward increas-
ing the efficiency of taxpayer
support for farm income. ◆
ket loss assistance payments, and
price support programs for dairy,
sugar, and peanuts each account
for roughly 20 percent of the sup-
port. Crop insurance represents 5
percent, while other agricultural
programs contribute the remaining
9 percent.
The end results of the cotton
dispute are still uncertain. How Con-
gress and the administration will
respond to this ruling, either in
modifying the current farm bill or in
creating the next farm bill, is un-
known. But the cotton ruling, com-
bined with the federal budget
pressures we are now seeing in the
United States, has the potential to
set off substantial changes in U.S.
agricultural policy. ◆
